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the Department of National Defence and from Wilfrid Laurier 
University.  The Director of the Centre is  Professor Terry Copp, 
Professor of History.
Canadian War Museum
1 Vimy Place
Ottawa, ON, K1R 1C2
The Canadian War Museum, the national military history 
museum, is a living memorial 
to those men and women who 
served in Canada’s armed forces. 
It is also a centre for research and 
dissemination of infor-mation 
and expertise on all aspects 
of the country’s military past 
from pre-contact era to the 
present. It preserves the artifacts 
of Canadian military experience, 
interprets them for present 
and future generations, and 
advances the professional 
study of Canadian military 
history, including the effects 
of war and conflict on the 
nation and all its citizens.
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3From the Editor-in-Chief
 Roger Sarty
 Editor-in-Chief
 May 2007
The editors of Canadian Military History wish to 
thank the following people and organizations for their 
contributions to this issue:
Maggie Arbour-Doucette, Brandey Barton, Michelle 
Fowler, Mark Humphries, Lianne Leddy, Christine 
Leppard, Vanessa McMackin, Susan Ross, Matt Symes, 
Jane Whalen, Jim Wood.
Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre; Canadian War 
Museum; Directorate of History & Heritage, Department 
of National Defence; Security and Defence Forum, 
Department of National Defence; Library and  Archives 
Canada; Wilfrid Laurier University.
S.F. (“Syd”) Wise, a leader of international stature in the development of military history 
since the 1950s, died in Ottawa on 8 March. He 
was 82, and still engaged in research. An article 
on his life and work will appear in the next issue, 
but I wanted to take this early opportunity to 
recognize his contribution. A native of Toronto, 
he went directly from high school graduation 
into the Royal Canadian Air Force in 1943. 
Immediately after the war, he entered honours 
history at the University of Toronto, graduating 
as a gold medallist in 1949. While working on 
his MA (awarded in 1953) he became a lecturer 
at the Royal Military College of Canada, and then 
a professor at Queen’s University. In 1966 he 
was selected by Charles Stacey, who had come 
out of retirement to unify the historical sections 
of the three armed forces into what is now the 
Directorate of History and Heritage, to become 
the director of the new unit. After organizing work 
on the official history of the Royal Canadian Air 
Force, he returned to academic life at Carleton 
University in 1973, where he remained until his 
very active retirement began in 1996. 
 Syd was the author, co-author or editor of 
some 13 books. In addition to his renowned 
military titles, Men in Arms (with R.A Preston and 
Herman Werner, 1956) and Canadian Airmen 
in the First World War: The Official History of 
the Royal Canadian Air Force, Vol. I (1980), 
the subjects were as diverse as sports, and the 
history of ideas. He was an inspirational teacher 
and leader, and a person of grace and empathy. 
I knew him only slightly, but benefitted from his 
encouragement, when still struggling in graduate 
school and in recent research efforts. My 
experience was typical of that of many students, 
teachers and writers, young and not-so-young. 
 It would be easy to say that by happy 
coincidence the articles in the present issue, on 
the confederation era, aboriginal history, and 
the history of a government institution, reflect 
Syd’s interests. But those interests were so wide 
that would be true of virtually any selection of 
articles.
 Cam Pulsifer, by dint of intense interest 
and research, has become something close to 
the “institutional memory” of the Canadian War 
Museum. The present piece on the origins of 
the museum is the fruit of a larger project on 
the history of the museum and, particularly, 
its collections to whose documentation Cam 
has made such an outstanding contribution. In 
2005 the University of New Brunswick Military 
and Strategic Studies Program (now the Gregg 
Centre for the Study of War and Society) enlisted 
the help of 4 Engineer Support Regiment at 
Canadian Forces Base Gagetown to clear a 
heavily overgrown confederation era fortification 
at Saint John, and record the details of the 
structure. It was a bitter-sweet experience. The 
fort proved to be in very good condition, but the 
whole exercise was necessary because it is on 
the verge of collapse into the sea as a result of 
coastal erosion. The team took the photographs 
and gathered the documentation presented in 
this issue expressly for publication in Canadian 
Military History. David Campbell has provided 
a chilling account of the little-analyzed battle of 
Courcelette, part of the British offensive on the 
Somme in 1916.  His research among personal 
memoirs, as well as the full range of official 
documents, lays  bare the brutality of a battle 
remembered mainly by the ‘Vingt-Deux,’ the 22nd 
Battalion, CEF: the heavy  cost of this brilliant 
success required the unit largely to be rebuilt. 
The same was true, Campbell shows, of many of 
the infantry units of the 2nd Canadian Division. 
Whitney Lackenbauer, in the course of his well-
known research on relations between First 
Peoples and the Canadian military, discovered 
the 1952 Macleans article reprinted here on 
Tommy Prince, Canada’s most famous aboriginal 
veteran. Whitney has supplied biographical notes 
that provide valuable context.
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4Sir,
I just finished reading Vol.15 Nos. 3 & 4, which should, 
perhaps, have been entitled 
“How the Gentlemen of the Air 
Force Won the War!” Several of 
the articles are factual and worth 
reading but “The Balance Sheet” 
by David L. Bashow, contains 
some problems. The worst part 
is the last section (p.62) entitled 
“Paving the Way for Operation 
Overlord.” It contains a number 
of unsupportable statements 
such as the first sentence, “The 
strategic bombing campaign 
made possible a direct invasion 
of Northwest Europe in the 
summer of 1944.” The facts are 
that in spite of the success of the 
deception scheme which kept 
the bulk of the best German 
defense troops in the Pas de 
Calais area (to repel an invasion 
from England) the Normandy 
defenses were manned by a 
force which was numerically not 
much smaller than the invading 
force, ie, a ratio of something 
like 1:1.5 – far less than the 
1:3 or 4 theoretically required 
for a successful attack on a 
strongly-defended position. The 
lodgement succeeded because 
the German defenders were 
for the most part of very poor 
quality. Had they all been equal 
to the 21st Panzer Division 
and 352nd Division it is highly 
possible the invasion would 
not have succeeded. We did not 
have overwhelming superiority 
in numbers.
 The lodgement held because 
of the amazing complexity 
German high command which 
prevented the several powerful 
German armoured divisions 
from attacking the bridgehead 
early on. These divisions 
(particularly 21st Panzer, 12th 
SS Panzer and Panzer Lehr) 
were close enough to have 
attacked hours and even days 
earlier than they actually did. 
They were delayed in reaching 
the bridgehead by a number 
of factors, of which Air Force 
bombing was only a small 
part.
 Later on during the Caen-
Falaise attack in July-August 
1944 the Wehrmacht was able 
to bring in two fresh infantry 
divisions (85th and 89th see 
Copp, Fields of Fire) from the 
Rouen area. So “destruction of 
the Seine bridges” did not “make 
effective German reinforcement 
virtually impossible.” Two fresh 
German divisions of good quality 
would seem to me to be bloody 
effective – we had no fresh 
divisions. Again, air superiority 
did not “secure the flanks.” 
 The statement that “Bomber 
Command dropped…5,000 tons 
of explosives on the defending 
beaches” need clarification. Few, 
if any, bombs hit the beaches 
– they landed in the fields 
well back – ask any guy from 
the “Poor Bloody Infantry” 
who landed there. The beach 
defenses were intact and were 
only conquered by the courage 
and skill of the “poor bloody 
infantry” (“Brown Jobs” to the 
Gentlemen of the Air Force) who 
landed in front of them.
 The climax of this section of 
the article is the statement by 
Goebbles , Hitler’s Propaganda 
Minister. I fought as an infantry 
rifle platoon commander in 
the Regina Rifles Regiment for 
the last 2 months of the war 
and only saw the Air Force in 
action once (a rather ineffective 
rocket attack by Typhoons). 
The Canadian Army suffered 
(ie. were not afraid of) severe 
casualties and won many fierce 
engagements from June 1944 
to May 1945 and were rarely, 
if ever, helped by bombing. The 
quotation from Goebbles is a 
direct and unacceptable insult 
to the Canadian (and US and 
British etc.) fighting men who 
bravely attacked and licked 
the enemy while suffering very 
severe casualties. The bombing 
of cities actually hindered us by 
making them easier to defend (ie, 
Caen, Cleve and Emmerich).
 Despite all the help from 
the Air Force, Canadian infantry 
divisions in Northwest Europe 
in 1944-1945 suffered equal 
or greater casualty rates than 
in the First World War while 
successfully beating German 
army forces, which they rarely 
outnumbered. Despite air force 
bombing the Germans always 
had plenty of ammunition & 
other supplies.
J.W. Keith, Captain, Retired
Calgary, Alberta
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